Insurance—Direct Action Statutes—Shipowner\u27s Limitation of Liability.—In the Matter of Independent Towing Co. by Uskevich, Robert J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 3 Article 27
4-1-1966
Insurance—Direct Action Statutes—Shipowner's
Limitation of Liability.—In the Matter of
Independent Towing Co.
Robert J. Uskevich
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Admiralty Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Uskevich, Insurance—Direct Action Statutes—Shipowner's Limitation of Liability.—In the
Matter of Independent Towing Co., 7 B.C.L. Rev. 746 (1966), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol7/iss3/27
•BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
have done, in effect reposed in the brand owner a greater amount of flexi-
bility. Further, were New York a "state liquor monopoly" state, having a
state agency as wholesaler and buyer from the brand owner, the agency
could by force of its economic power or by statute require the same affirma-
tion that the present statute requires, as is done in Pennsylvania. 30 Thus, to
declare the statute invalid for reason of the method selected to achieve the
desired results would be to penalize the state for granting to the industry
more rights and flexibility than it had to give or to penalize the state for
not operating its own liquor monopoly. This would put a premium on form
and cleverness rather than on substance and straightforwardness.
The Supreme Court has noted jurisdiction. 40 The liquor industry, if it
is to prevail, is faced with a formidable task. The industry must convince
the Court that the objectives of the statute are not protected by the twenty-
first amendment and are an unwarranted exercise of police power 4 ' or that the
method chosen to achieve the objectives is invalid because of the extra-
territorial effects that result from the operation of the statute. It is submitted
that the statute's objectives are well within the powers granted the states by
the twenty-first amendment; that the statute is a valid exercise of police
power; and that the indirect extraterritorial effects of the statute are not
such as to render the statute unconstitutional.
WILLIAM A. LONG
Insurance—Direct Action Statutes—Shipowner's Limitation of Liability.
—In the Matter of Independent Towing Co. 1 —The claimants brought an
action in the federal district court in Louisiana against the owners of the
tug Itco III for damages suffered in a maritime accident in Louisiana waters.
The tug owners, in turn, filed for a limitation proceeding.° An injunction
was issued prohibiting all suits against the vessel and owners until de-
termination of the limitation proceeding. The claimants then instituted
actions against the vessel's insurer pursuant to Louisiana's direct action
statute.3
 The insurers, claiming that no direct action could be brought against
them until final determination of the limitation proceeding, sought a stay.
They maintained that they could not be found liable until the shipowner's
liability had been established, and then only up to the amount that the
32 Supra note 1, at 57, 209 N.E.2d at 704, 262 N.Y,S.2d at 80.
40
 34 U.S.L. Week 3182 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1965) (No. 545).
41
 The argument can be persuasively made that the statute is a valid exercise of
police power, apart from the twenty-first amendment, under the decision in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in that a state can protect its citizens from discrimina-
tory pricing. The regulation is valid unless arbitrary, discriminatory, or irrelevant to a
policy the legislature is free to adopt. In the present case, the state has enacted a statute
aimed at protecting its citizens; the statute can be shown to be neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory; and it is sufficiently flexible to allow the industry to adjust prices to a
profitable level.
242 F. Supp. 950 (ED. La. 1965).
2
 Rev. Stat. § 4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
a La. Rev. Stat. § 22:655 (Supp. 1964).
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owner would be required to pay. HELD: Direct action may be brought
against the underwriters before final determination of the limitation pro-
ceeding.
The relevance of the shipowner's limitation of liability in an action
commenced directly against the shipowner's insurer is a problem that has
plagued the courts. The limitation of liability statute, passed by Congress
in 1851, provides:
The liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any loss, or destruc-
tion by any person of any property . . . shipped or put on board
of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or
for any act . . . done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or
knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not . . . exceed the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and
her freight then pending. 4
The limitation proceeding was intended to serve a twofold purpose: (1) To
encourage investment in the merchant marine by limiting the liability
of owners for the acts and accidents of masters of their ships, where such
acts were done "without the privity or knowledge"° of the owners; and
(2) to consolidate into one proceeding all possible claims against a ship
or its owners° and hence avoid the harassment, inconvenience and expense
to the shipowners of defending suits in a number of jurisdictions.
The limitation proceeding, as was first noted by Judge Ware in The
Rebecca,7
 has traditionally been regarded as a defense personal° to the
shipowner. Thus, with the advent of the direct action statutes, the question
arose whether the defense was also available to the insurer.
Under the Louisiana direct action statute:
No policy or contract of liability shall be issued or delivered in this
state, unless . . the injured person . . . shall have a right of
direct action against the insurer . . . , and such action may be
brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and
insurer jointly and in solido .. It is also the intent of this Section
4
 Rev. Stat. § 4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1964).
5 Where privity or knowledge exists on the part of the owner, he is unable to
claim the benefit derived from the statute. Ibid.
6 Claims are to be filed within 6 months; later claims may be allowed, but only
if not prejudicial to the shipowner. Rev. Stat. § 4285 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
7
 20 Fed. Cas. 373 (No. 11619) (C.C.D. Me. 1831). This was the first United
States case recognizing the European common law defense of limitation of liability.
As discussed in the opinion, the limitation proceeding was personal to the shipowner
and solely for his benefit. Id. at 378-80. Consequently, the limitation of liability was
recognized in the United States prior to its formal adoption by the Act of 1851, and
has always been regarded as personal to the shipowner.
8
 Among the personal defenses which are not available to the insurer in a direct
action are the insolvency of the insured, incapacities arising out of the personal rela-
tionships between injured and insured (such as husband-wife or father-son) and, in
general, defenses which do not arise out of the contract of insurance. See, e.g., Edwards
v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 176, 161 So. 191, 194-95 (1953) (husband and
wife).
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that all liability policies .. . are executed for the benefit of all
injured persons ... .°
The uniqueness of the Louisiana statute is that suit may be brought by the
injured party against the insurer prior to the determination of the insured's
liability; 1° in the majority of states with direct action statutes, suits against
the insurer are allowed only after a determination 'of the insured's liability."
Louisiana courts have, in addition, interpreted the statute to deny to the
insurer, when sued in a direct action, the personal defenses of the insured. 12
The rationale behind this is simple: the sole reason for allowing personal
defenses is that public policy deems them necessary; consequently, when
the reason for their necessity fails, so does the right to plead them. 13 In the
instant case, the court concluded that public policy demanded protection
only for the shipowner, and since there were no policy reasons to extend
the limitation to the insurer, he was not allowed to avail himself of the
defense.
In denying the availability of the defense to the insurer, however, the
court was beset with a new problem: if an action is allowed against the
insurer, and he is found liable and pays his liability, the full value of the
insurance may be used up; if, afterwards, the insured is sued directly, he
would be liable up to the amount determined in a limitation proceeding, and
would not be able to look to the insurer for indemnification by reason of
the prior extinction of the latter's obligation. Thu's, the insured would lose,
the benefit of his insurance policy.
This precise problem previously reached the United States Supreme
Court in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing." In that case, as in the instant
case, the issue was whether the same Louisiana direct action statute should
be applicable in a maritime casualty action. Four of the Justices felt that
the application of the statute to maritime claims would defeat the purpose
of the limitation proceeding.15 In considering the possible loss of the insur-
ance benefits by the shipowner, they concluded that "to permit direct actions
under the State statute would require that shipowners become self-insurers
for liability risks in order to be sure of getting the full protection of the
limitation legislation."16 Four dissenting Justices •thought that the direct
action should be allowed since otherwise the insurer would be benefited by
the limitation proceeding, which is neither the original intent nor a desir-
9 La. Rev. Stat. § 22:655 (Supp. 1964).
10
 Ibid. See Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
11
 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-175 (1958); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175, §§ 112,
113 (1959); N.Y. Ins. Law § 167. See generally Leigh, Direct Actions Against Liability
Insurers, 1949 Ins. L.J. 633, 637 (1949).
12
 Edwards v. Royal Indem. Co., supra note 8, at 174-78, 161 So. at 193-94. In
this case the wife of the insured was injured in an automobile accident. In a direct
action against the insurer, coverture was pleaded as a defense, The court held that
such a defense was personal to the husband and such "personal defenses" were not
available to the underwriters.
13 Ibid. See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 367, 150 Ati. 905, 912 (1930).
14 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
15 Id. at 413-23.
16 Id. at 419.
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able extension of the, federal statute.' 7
 Mr. Justice Clark, in a separate
opinion, recognized the problem of the loss of insurance benefits but felt
that it could be avoided by allowing a direct action to be instituted only
after determination of the limitation proceeding.' 8
The district court, announcing its intention to resolve the 4-4-1 stale-
mate of Cushing, established the following alternatives:
I. If the policy limits be sufficient to satisfy the claims estab-
lished in the direct actions, there the matter ends, and the limita-
tion proceeding as concerns the direct action claimants would be-
come moot.
IL Should the insurance coverage be insufficient to satisfy all
the claims in the direct action against the insurer, then the court'
would proceed with the limitation hearing.
A. If the limitation is granted and the amount of the limita-
tion fund exceeds the insurance coverage, then the fund would be
credited with the insurance recovery, and the remainder would be
distributed to the claimants in accordance with the amount and
rank of the claims proven.
B. If limitation is granted, but the fund is less than the
amount of insurance coverage, then the limitation fund is credited
with the amount already recovered from the shipowner's insurer,
and no further recovery would be allowed.
• C. If no limitation of liability is granted, then the shipowner
would be credited with the amount of damages recovered from the
insurer in the direct actions, and then stand liable for the entire
amount by which the proven damages exceed the insurance cover-
age•'D
In the case at hand, since a limitation proceeding had already been
commenced prior to institution of the direct action statute and the plaintiffs
in the direct action suit were identical with the plaintiffs in • the suit against
the shipowner, these alternatives are sufficient. However, where the direct
action is commenced prior to any determination of the liability of the in-
sured, the insurer may not plead limitation of liability as a defense. Apply-
ing the alternatives set forth by the district court, the insurer would then
pay the judgment obtained in the direct action to the claimants therein to the
extent of the policy.2°
Consider the situations this could create: later, before the expiration
of the statute of limitations, another claimant who was not a party to the
direct action suit might bring a claim against the insured. Even if limitation
were granted, since the insured could not be credited with any insurance
fund (this having already been extinguished), he would, as a consequence,
lose the benefit of his insurance policy. Similarly, if the plaintiffs in the
direct action suit are not identical with those in a concurrently instituted
17 Id. at 427-38.
18 Id. at 423-27.
19
 In the Matter of Independent Towing Co., supra note 1, at 956.
20 Ibid. This situation would fall under alternative I.
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suit against the shipowner, there is nothing in the court's alternatives to
prevent the former plaintiffs from recovering the entire insurance proceeds
if their suit is completed first, leaving the latter plaintiffs to satisfy any
judgment they might obtain only out of the personal assets of the shipowner.
In the second of these situations, it might be argued that the commence-
ment of the limitation proceedings by the shipowner would force all plain-
tiffs to join in that suit or be barred by the six month federal statute of
limitations. It is likely that this federally guaranteed right to consolidate
would not be allowed to be abrogated by a state procedural statute. But
where the limitation proceeding is not commenced before judgment is ren-
dered in the direct action suits, the federal statute of limitations cannot
begin to run, and hence the insurance funds may be dissipated by the
direct action plaintiffs. If the insured, in a later judgment against him, is
thus denied the benefits of his insurance, this may result in a deprivation
of his federally guaranteed right to a limitation of liability. His out-of-pocket
payments really include not only the liability determined in the limitation
proceedings but also the amount of the insurance premiums paid in to obtain
the insurance fund dissipated in the earlier direct action.
This problem of increasing the shipowner's required payment beyond
that determined in the limitation proceeding might be met by allowing the
insured to deduct from his liability the amount he has paid out in premums. 21
However, this has the obvious disadvantage of , favoring early claimants,
and imposing the cost of payments to later claimants, contrary to the usual
practice of allowing every claimant to share the total liability of the ship-
owner in proportion to his claim.
Another solution, and a logical extension of the alternatives put forth
by the court, would be to credit the shipowner with any judgments paid by
the insurer in a direct action. Although this would give the insured the full
benefits of his policy, it would work to the detriment of the injured, con-
trary to the policy of the Louisiana direct action statute that insurance
policies be construed for the benefit of the injured party 2 2 A prior limita-
tion proceeding, on the other hand, would serve to consolidate all claims,
such that all claimants would share equally and proportionately 28
Perhaps it could be required that any sums recovered against the insurer
be paid into a court fund until the statute of limitations has run. This
would also permit the insured to retain the full benefits of his insurance.
This would have the disadvantage, however, of delaying recovery to needy
claimants, and to institute such a system would likely require legislative
amendment.
Even if a satisfactory solution to this problem can be found, to allow
suits against the insurer without a prior limitation proceeding will also defeat
a second purpose of the federal limitation statute—the consolidation of suits
against the shipowner. A multiplicity of claims filed against the insurer in
a variety of jurisdictions would force the insurer to defend all over the
21 Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 119-21 (1871).
22 La. Rev. Stat. § 22:655 (Supp. 1964).
23 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964).
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country. Since the witnesses relied on by the insurer in defense of these
actions will no doubt include the crew and associates of the insured's ship,
the insured will have to allow his employees to partake in these actions thus
possibly leaving his ship inactive. On the other hand, if the suits had been
brought against the insured, a limitation proceeding would have determined
all the factual issues involved, become binding on all claimants, and thus
eliminated the need for the employees' testimony at any other trials. 24
Clearly, then, solutions additional to those proposed by the court must
be found. An obvious solution would be to have the insurance company join .
all possible plaintiffs 25 in a single proceeding. However, this would be pos-
sible only where all claimants are within the jurisdiction of the court and,
consequently, joinable. Considering the possible ramifications of the present
holding,25 the most practical solution seems to remain that set forth by
Mr. Justice Clark in the Cushing case—that the Louisiana direct action
statute be applicable to cases of marine insurance, but only after determina-
tion of the shipowner's liability in a limitation proceeding. 27
 This would
effectuate consolidation of suits, assure the shipowner the maximum benefit
of his insurance, and protect all claimants. Although such a solution may
appear contrary to existing Louisiana law, this area of maritime insurance
requires an exception in the application of the direct action statute if justice
is to be better served.
It is likely that the district court was influenced by the feeling that need
for limitation proceedings no longer exists, and was responding to con-
gressional inaction in the area; Congress has afforded relief to the injured
claimants in maritime casualties only once in the hundred-plus years this
statute has been in effect. 25
 Now, in a time when insurance has become the
dominant consideration of tort liability and such a large part of our way of
life, the need for limitation no longer exists. The time is ripe for a legislative
re-examination of the area.
ROBERT J. USKEVICH
24
 Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1883).
25
 For possible federal joinder, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.
26 Another possible effect may be a raise in the premium rates on marine insurance,
since present rates are based on the assumption that limitation of liability extends to
the insurer. Arguably, by not extending the limitation defense, the very party intended
to be protected by it, the shipowner, is shouldered with an additional burden. See
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, supra note 14, at 417.
27 Id. at 427.
28
 Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 1, 49 Stat. 1479, 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1964),
amending Rev. Stat. § 4283 (1875):
Ulf the amount of the owner's liability as limited . . . is insufficient to pay all
losses in full, and the portion of such amount applicable to the payment of
losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury is less than $60 per ton . . ,
such portion shall be increased to an amount equal to $60 per ton, to be avail-
able only for the payment of losses in respect of loss of life or bodily injury.
If such portion so increased is insufficient to pay such losses in full, they shall
be paid therefrom in proportion to their respective amounts,
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